

## *The 9th of November and the “Armenian Forces”*

Postscriptum

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Martin Sonnenborn, representative of the DIE PARTEI party in the EU Parliament, posted a tweet on November 9 with the following quote from Henryk M. Broder<sup>1</sup>: "If November 9 is to have any semblance of meaning and credibility, it would have to serve as a 'reminder' of today. [...] The Armenians are threatened with genocide for the second time in their history and [...] they are being abandoned by Europe just as the Jews were in the 1930s." Sonneborn remarks: "Broder also visited Nagorno-Karabakh, even before we did.... There have been German arms exports to Turkey for over half a billion € since 2002. If Azerbaijan should flatten Nagorno-Karabakh, that will also be a victory for German arms..." He wrote this at 12:59 EU time, and the textual content indicates that he may not have known about the events in the Caucasus at that time. But the content implies a gruesome parallel.

During my visits to the Victory Monument "Mair Hayastan" in Yerevan, built in memory of the victory over Hitler's fascism, I once met a veteran of the Karabakh war of the 1990s, who was then serving as the director of the museum. We were on the second floor of the museum, the interior design of which is modeled on a chapel to Haghbat, which can be seen primarily from the dome. I said to him that it was like being in a church. He replied with a grin, "It is a church!" He told me that the 9th of May, that is, the day of the capture of Shushi, was purely coincidental, and explained this on the basis of the adverse circumstances that had led to delays, so that the 9th came to be Victory Day and the circular reasoning to be the day of the victory over Hitler's fascism. Thus, the peculiar circumstance arises that May 9 and November 9 mean something differently to both Germans and Armenians and in this sense are mutually related to each other.<sup>2</sup>

To the thoughts in the first part on the subject of "rebel" as an implicit attribution for the Armenians living in Arzakh in toto can be added a current date. The Deutschlandfunk reports

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<sup>1</sup> Broder is a German-Jewish writer.

<sup>2</sup> Events, which can also be seen as coincidence, are subject to the perceivers in this relation and determinable by this.

in its news on the 10th: "Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan under international law, but is controlled by Armenian forces. At the end of September, fighting had broken out there again"<sup>3</sup>. If we remember, in the news BEFORE the ceasefire there was at least a reference to the fact that Armenians LIVE there, too, even if this was ultimately subjected to the intention to suggest to the consumer that all in all they are rebels. The latest news now about life in Arzach tell us, that there are only "Armenian forces" at work, which lets connote conceptually rather military and calls thereby the physics on the plan to create suitable counterforces. We find them, for example, in the use of drone technology.

## **Boell Foundation and LINKE - Part 2**

In continuation of the first part the representatives Stefan Meister and Heiko Langner will be discussed again with regard to further assessment of the conflict even after the agreement.

The head of the Böll Foundation, which is close to the Greens Party and is stationed in Tbilisi, continues to provide comments after the agreement that adhere to the image of a war that took place primarily between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia and Turkey are assigned to such an isolated pair of opposites, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Here as well as there, the leader seems to have an erroneous inclination to a parity determination of the relations, because according to the amount, Russia does not have the role for Armenia that Turkey has for Azerbaijan, already not in historical view. The linguistic style of the author is characterized by a pseudo-objectivity, which tends to a mere moderation of the events.

If Meister divides the relations between the warring parties into a level of actual warring parties with Armenia and Azerbaijan and, as described, above that a level of ultimately parity of influence with Russia and Turkey, then miraculously missing is the expansion to include the role of Georgia, the country where Meister and the Böll Foundation are stationed, as an important logistical transit point for the transport of war material. Why this happens remains Meister's secret.

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<sup>3</sup> [https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/berg-karabach-frankreich-fordert-interessen-armeniens-zu.2932.de.amp?drn:news\\_id=1193071](https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/berg-karabach-frankreich-fordert-interessen-armeniens-zu.2932.de.amp?drn:news_id=1193071)

In an interview on November 11<sup>4</sup>, he analyzes that after the armistice agreement the "hatred between the ethnic groups" had become even greater. The hatred among Armenians after the terrible dictate is understandable, but remains, Meister seems to suggest with his narration, on the level of emotion, especially since it links to the trauma originating from 1915. Thus, the Armenian who has just suffered a loss appears isolated in his pain from that which caused him pain. It is reminiscent in style of the way Erdogan sees the relationship between Armenian and Turkish history: To each nation its memory - and the memory of it. Armenians and Turks are isolated from each other in this relationship and have nothing to do with each other in this respect.<sup>5</sup>

Meister's use of the term "ethnic group" is also revealing. He uses "ethnic group" to identify Abkhazians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. within a multi-ethnic state structure. Armenians and other ethnic groups thus refer to the superior state as a minority in this relation.<sup>6</sup> "Ethnic group" in the context meant by Meister thus refers to Armenians as well as to Azerbaijanis on a parity basis. The only question is whether this parity is coherent in terms of word usage.

"People" according to Luchterhandt can be understood on the one hand "in the sense of 'Staatsvolk' (nation) [...] i.e. the totality of the nationals living on a (state territory defined by international law) national territory, on the other hand in the sense of an ethnic community (ethnos), i.e. a group of people singled out and thus delimited by certain common features such as language, culture, religion [...]."<sup>7</sup> Ethnic group can thus circumscribe a nation as a whole or denote an (ethnic) minority within a (superordinate) whole.<sup>8</sup> In the case of Armenians in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh, relative to Baku, they were an ethnic minority, i.e., an ethnic group, in this sense and, as a self-attribution, also a nation. In the case of the independent but unrecognized state, one was Armenian, Armenian nationality and Arzhak.

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<sup>4</sup> [https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/abkommen-fuer-bergkarabach-das-hauptproblem-ist-der-hass-in.694.de.html?dram%3Aarticle\\_id=487329&fbclid=IwAR3HIIDtj6GFATedvULZFAZHcyvzlj2NaOCrL1UvTXNXfkMCwF2DdcYgwpI](https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/abkommen-fuer-bergkarabach-das-hauptproblem-ist-der-hass-in.694.de.html?dram%3Aarticle_id=487329&fbclid=IwAR3HIIDtj6GFATedvULZFAZHcyvzlj2NaOCrL1UvTXNXfkMCwF2DdcYgwpI)

<sup>5</sup> [https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/abkommen-fuer-bergkarabach-das-hauptproblem-ist-der-hass-in.694.de.html?dram%3Aarticle\\_id=487329&fbclid=IwAR3HIIDtj6GFATedvULZFAZHcyvzlj2NaOCrL1UvTXNXfkMCwF2DdcYgwpI](https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/abkommen-fuer-bergkarabach-das-hauptproblem-ist-der-hass-in.694.de.html?dram%3Aarticle_id=487329&fbclid=IwAR3HIIDtj6GFATedvULZFAZHcyvzlj2NaOCrL1UvTXNXfkMCwF2DdcYgwpI). However, this was not a "genocide fixation" on behalf of the Armenians implied by Meister, which would be more likely to reflect the vagaries of the politics of memory in Germany. The manner of the war of aggression, the quality and quantity of the destruction of people and matter should evoke genocide associations among Armenians, and therefore do not happen by rummaging around in the box of the past and assigning them (cf. Christian Kolter: Reasons why the current 9/11/2020 ceasefire based on the tripartite declaration will not bring stability to the Karabakh conflict (for a long time yet). (28.11.). Mskrpt. For present in : KAS – Digitale Veranstaltung: „Der Berg-Karabach-Konflikt – keine Stabilisierung in Sicht?“ 28.11.2020

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.bpb.de/internationales/weltweit/innerstaatliche-konflikte/233506/die-innere-logik-der-konflikte-im-post-sowjetischen-raum>

<sup>7</sup> Luchterhandt 1993:34.

<sup>8</sup> In URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24259334>, pp. 145, 153, Luchterhandt makes the concept of ethnic group as minority for the case of the Crimean Tatars.

For the question to be discussed here, whether "Azerbaijanis" can get the same quality of an "ethnic group" as "Armenians", we look at the genesis of Azerbaijan as a state. Here we refer to the statements in the first part, where the "omnivoros" character of the Azerbaijani state or its policy is described. There are Azerbaijanis as an ethnic group within the state structure of Azerbaijan, but this is something different from the state of Azerbaijan. Therefore, the ethnic group of Armenians is not equal to that of an Azerbaijani as a mere citizen. In the construction of history, the phase of the actual birth, which is closely connected with the father of Azerbaijan, Stalin, is bypassed. This also has an impact on the discussion about Arzakh:

If it is claimed from the scientific side that both Azerbaijan and Armenia have equal claim to Arzakh, it is simply wrong. Azerbaijan has no historical roots in Arzakh except that Stalin annexed it.<sup>9</sup> But this is rather ahistorical in its legitimization, if we consider said historical constructions. The war or its result is its practical implementation.

If we look at the statements made by Heiko Langner of the Left Party in the Bundestag regarding the conflict, their ideological basis seems to be an outdated class model: The historical origins of the conflict go back to the time of the bourgeois revolution in tsarist Russia 115 years ago. At that time, social class contradictions between Azerbaijani agricultural workers, who migrated en masse from the countryside in search of work to what was then the world's largest oil-producing area around Baku, and the local, nascent Armenian merchant bourgeoisie first erupted in violent conflict. The conflict, which was essentially social, was later quickly ethnicized as a result of Soviet nationality policy, because the state structure was hierarchized according to national territories, i.e., "national in form, socialist in content."<sup>10</sup> This then leads to the wars of 1992-94, 2016 and now. The fact is for Langner: Armenia is pursuing a policy of occupation, and Armenians do not live in self-determination in Arzakh - if at all.

If the model of class contradiction within the LEFT may be true, it becomes a contradiction within the LEFT par excellence, if they want to throw it on Arzakh and the conflict with Azerbaijan as a grid. Here, especially, the absurd accusation that the Armenians want to make common cause with the AfD stands out: "[T]he territories of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia and separatist forces are not regrettable individual cases, but have a system. The Armenian secessionist regime in Nagorno-Karabakh and the AfD have common ground on essential issues and share a similar mindset. Both are convinced of the alleged superiority of Christian

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. Broadcast „Kulturzeit“ vom 13.11.2020 [https://www.3sat.de/kultur/kulturzeit/krieg-in-berg-karabach-100.html?fbclid=IwAR1cqHUKge1kP7G4DA0Pxsqfzc1InlUbnGA\\_WXLvkbG-OGCociLvdhW4rtA](https://www.3sat.de/kultur/kulturzeit/krieg-in-berg-karabach-100.html?fbclid=IwAR1cqHUKge1kP7G4DA0Pxsqfzc1InlUbnGA_WXLvkbG-OGCociLvdhW4rtA)

<sup>10</sup><https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/43074/ein-neuer-krieg-um-bergkarabach?cHash=ffbeca95f83edf2896de63bef963ab52>

civilization and accordingly advocate a politics of ethnic identity at the expense of other population groups." <sup>11</sup> Armenians simply do not want to be satisfied with their role in Langner's model and instead practice separation and secession (it should be remembered according to which rules this properly took place and who ignores this fact). Now, fortunately, Azerbaijan, Turkey in association with EU and NATO have put a stop to this.

The belief in the primacy of "Christian civilization" as well as "völkisches Denken" unites AfD and the Armenians, according to Langner, who makes this out of the church buildings in Karabakh, whose time of origin dates back to the 4th century - however: "Despite the catastrophic economic situation, imposing new churches were built in Nagorno-Karabakh for identity-political reasons and existing churches were lavishly restored in order to underline a permanent claim of ownership to the conquered territory. While Nagorno-Karabakh is presented to the outside world as an ancient Christian settlement area, the cultural evidence of the centuries-long presence of the Muslim population in the region has been left to decay or sometimes even destroyed."<sup>12</sup>

However, the new buildings as well as the restorations were financed by the Armenian diaspora, so they have to be interpreted from this perspective. Moreover, Nagorno-Karabakh IS an ancient Christian settlement area, while Muslim evidence refers to the Persian period, so has little to do with Azerbaijan. So, one must assume that Langner follows the Azerbaijani omnivoros image here as well, leveling the differences in favor of Azerbaijan, Turkey and especially his LEFT class model. Finally, Langner crowns his analysis by equating the AfD and the "separatist regime" in Arzakh with "völkische nationalists": "Both political actors, the AfD as well as the separatist regime in Nagorno-Karabakh, as völkische nationalists [...] have problems with the recognition of social diversity, a liberal social constitution that grants equal rights to minorities, gender equality and non-traditional family designs. Given this, they also do not find it difficult to enter into strategic collaborations with each other."<sup>13</sup>

It is easy to see that Langner has the AfD in mind with his criticism. However, the separatists characterized in this way as backward (the "wild Caucasus") serve this purpose, against which the populist mind of the AfD is then measured and it comes to identities for the observer Langner. Thus, it is not left out that the people in Karabakh, as in Armenia, are "Islamophobic" as a whole, which can then be transferred to the AfD. In Langner's perspective the Armenians, like the AfD, behave the same way toward Muslims: "The AfD

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

also denies that Islam belongs to Germany and purposefully spreads sweeping prejudices against Muslims who are considered to be unable to integrate into the German majority society, because this runs counter to its own and ultimately racist idea of ethnic-cultural homogeneity of the völkisch community."<sup>14</sup>

In summary, it can be said that the alleged Islamophobia in its equation with German conditions represents one of the points of intersection that Langner's imagination shares with that of the Trotskyist-influenced group Marx21, which takes the so-called legalist wing of Islam in Germany, infiltrated for example by the Turkish Grey Wolves, positively for its own work and can certainly cooperate with Islamists : "Among those active in the Left Party and the Linksjugend, Marx21 has long been known as an opponent of an anti-Islamist positioning, which even the Left Party politician Sevim Dagdelen considers to be a racist aide on the basis of her criticism of Erdogan."<sup>15</sup> Dagdelen, this is to be supplemented, stands with its critical position in the controversy around the Turkish-Azerbaijani attack war in its party rather alone there. Instead, the chairman of the reactionary ZdM, Mazyek, and other AKP supporters can speak at the Marx21 "Marx-is-Muss" congress.<sup>16</sup>

With Meister and Langner, two representatives act who, from a point of view on this side of the border fence, throw a grid on its other side and there eliminate or simply ignore what is considered superfluous or harmful by their own, brought along, ideology.

Tom de Waal analyzes the cease-fire in his own way of moderating the events in Karabakh, but in this he is quite analogous to Meister and Langner. He does not even discuss the offensive nature of the cease-fire, but instead tries to sound out Putin's intentions in the South Caucasus: "Russian President Vladimir Putin might see reasons to push for a full peace agreement that restores relations between two important neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Then again he might not: if the two sides are in a state of suspended hostilities, that is a good reason for the Russian peacekeepers to stay. Russia's agenda is probably more about

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<sup>14</sup> <https://www.alumniportal-aserbaidshchan.de/2019/06/03/heiko-langner-uber-die-illegale-reise-von-afd-abgeordneten-in-aserbaidshchanische-berg-karabach-region/42/25/maskaaska/999/allgemein/>

Silvia Stöber from the ARD-tagesschau also discovers slippages in the AfD, such as the assumption that "Christian civilization" is at stake in Armenia. The reasons, however, why this reduction falls short is itself questionable: For the woman from the ARD, money is available to recruit the Islamists. Money, however, as historical experience shows, never stood in the way of the spread of religion and religious fundamentalism, so it does not exclude itself.

<https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/kampf-kulturen-religionen-bergkarabach-101.html>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.ruhrbarone.de/marx21-mit-den-islamisten-manchmal-mit-dem-staat-niemals/162860>

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. On the connection between the Left and Islam:: Pascal Bruckner: Die Islam-Linke oder: Die Vereinigung des Zorns, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik. 12/2020, S. 85-94

projecting its own power and about trade routes than about long-term peace in the South Caucasus."<sup>17</sup> The contrast implied by de Waal here between "full peace agreement" on the one hand and balancing "suspended hostilities" on the other is not one, because it can be assumed that Putin never thought of a peace agreement. Putin never had the choice of seeking a permanent peace settlement: The moment Putin makes the agreement on 9/11, he is dealing not only with Aliyev, but at the same time with Erdogan, who has not bothered with peace intentions for quite some time.

Political consultant Eric Hacobian sees Karabakh as Russia's territory implemented by Putin. Putin pulls the ethnic card<sup>18</sup>, citing the 1988 Sumgait killings in this context. Karabakh is not territory of Azerbaijan. This also seems logical, since Stalin incorporated Karabakh as an autonomous region of Azerbaijan. As an autonomous region, which it was from the very beginning on Stalin's political map, it is not in character subordinate to Baku in toto. According to Hacobian, a distinction must then be made between an Armenian Armenia and a Russian Armenia - namely Karabakh. The status issue is relevant to Putin because it proves the legitimacy of Russia's presence on the ground. But that does not mean that the ethnic question does not exist.<sup>19</sup>

## **Pashinyan's Mindset**

### **Western actionism?**

Moving on to a critique of Armenia's prime minister, we turn to Marguerita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of RT, a Russian broadcaster loyal to Putin.<sup>20</sup> She can be described as a borderline

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<sup>17</sup> [https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/83267?fbclid=IwAR0sf\\_H8BANCb50G0CgHsWlpDtwWSMjRRUyCZSpJZM7p\\_8zrr4bft09CVpM](https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/83267?fbclid=IwAR0sf_H8BANCb50G0CgHsWlpDtwWSMjRRUyCZSpJZM7p_8zrr4bft09CVpM)

<sup>18</sup> Langner draws on Rosa Luxemburg for his argument, who "already clairvoyantly recognized that an ethnicist understanding of self-determination is incompatible with an internationalist class politics" "<https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/43074/ein-neuer-krieg-um-bergkarabach?cHash=ffbeca95f83edf2896de63bef963ab52> (https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/43074/ein-neuer-krieg-um-bergkarabach?cHash=ffbeca95f83edf2896de63bef963ab52). To this would have to be added implicitly the actual influence of religion, which it is said to have in war. (<https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/kampfkulturen-religionen-bergkarabach-101.html>). In order to sound out the relationship of religion to politics for the case of Arzach/Armenia, we make use of the scene I have described with the veteran in the Victory Monument Museum. In the architecture of the hall on the second floor, space and time and the relationship of Armenian Christianity to the sphere surrounding it, which at that time was a Soviet one with corresponding conditions (cf. Gispert 2002, 2005), are condensed. Armenian Christianity built its space in such a relation, which goes back to its founding period (fwd. Gispert 2021)

<sup>19</sup> [https://www.civilnet.am/news/2020/11/19/What%E2%80%99s-Russia%E2%80%99s-Play-in-Karabakh/408961?fbclid=IwAR00TuO1Wk\\_BrtLpax4aF-ri1Up4sjTWiOnWS-2\\_834vs7zt8SoNsMKk3B4](https://www.civilnet.am/news/2020/11/19/What%E2%80%99s-Russia%E2%80%99s-Play-in-Karabakh/408961?fbclid=IwAR00TuO1Wk_BrtLpax4aF-ri1Up4sjTWiOnWS-2_834vs7zt8SoNsMKk3B4). 19 November, 2020 18:42

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.7or.am/am/news/view/201432/>; Vgl. auch <http://top-news.am/?p=93283&l=am&fbclid=IwAR2lbfcoj9zhADfjZ-rBkMMqRhtYgTxznHzsaROY5VHrhvMPsP8vBSuBZrU>

phenomenon within Armenian culture. She is Armenian, married to an Armenian, but converted to Russian patriotism and blames the Armenians in her old homeland for betraying Russia. From this point of view, she also comments on the results of November 9: on November 10, she renews the accusations she had already made in August against the Armenians as a whole and Pashinyan in particular.<sup>21</sup> Given the events of the days before, the repetition reads as a cynical confirmation - "Do you see...?": "Any Armenian who now tries to criticize Russia should cut off his dirty tongue. Only the citizens of Armenia can criticize themselves. The fact that a national traitor was brought to power arguing with the only historical defender of the Armenian people created the conditions for this war. Where are Soros, the State Department, the Pentagon, Macron and who else is there? They can't find you on the map. [...] "<sup>22</sup> However, it must be added that people in Russia wondered why Pashinyan had not made representations to Putin before Oct. 20. Instead, the president toured Brussels to ask for help, but received nothing substantial.<sup>23</sup> Dmitri Trenin of Moscow's Carnegie Center is perhaps a bit less strident than Mrs. Simonyan - but by the amount, he strikes the same note: "Russians are looking at their alliances, and one school of thought in Moscow is that ,if people want our protection, they have to be good allies; they have to stand with us; they shouldn't be ashamed by being closer to us because you know you cannot expect Russia to bail you out and at the same time try to impress the West how pro-Western you are: you need to choose.""<sup>24</sup>

Pashinyan officially took office in 2018 to fight and end corruption. Closely related to this, however, are the names of the two state presidents before, Kocharyan and Sargsyan, who are not only seen by Pashinyan as symbols of corruption, but are also a thorn in his personal side. The events in 2008 in the course of the then election, when Pashinyan was imprisoned by the government under Sargsyan, left him with a desire for retribution that was also personally motivated, which certainly makes the political eye dim. It is reasonable to assume that this basic feeling, along with other incompetence, may have guided his actions with regard to the relationship with Karabakh (e.g., the attribution of the "Karabakh clan" circulating in the

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<sup>21</sup> <http://top-news.am/?p=93283&l=am&fbclid=IwAR2lbfcoj9zhADfjZ-rBkMMqRhtYgTxznHzsaR0Y5VHrhvMPsP8vBSuBZrU>

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.7or.am/am/news/view/201432/>

<sup>23</sup> Simonyan's attacks were naturally understood in Armenia as an attack on her own nation, which is why she was no longer allowed to be suffered there "as an Armenian". Cynically, the reaction of the West to Pashinyan's pleas could be described as "victim sympathy".

<sup>24</sup> <http://georgiatoday.ge/news/23014/Trenin%3A-%22The-Armenians-Will-Have-to-Eat-their-Bitter-Humble-Pie%22-%26-Georgia-Draw-Lessons?fbclid=IwAR1yu42nOyLoyTTKUzcFgKNXe6kcTN38AyL2oGiTr2vi9ddThhRhqRLqUT8>



opposition before 2018 in the direction of those in power). But this would need to be examined separately.

Pashinyan's ideologically conditioned westward twist is combined with an actionism that is also populist in nature, and which manifests itself as a diplomatic disaster in the dispute over Karabakh. This concerns, for example, the following two events in early and late August 2019, which should be read together. In early August, Pashinyan visited Arzakh and called there for the country's unification with Armenia.<sup>25</sup> Here it is necessary to keep in mind that, in a way, he was anticipating what was actually one of the goals of the whole negotiations of the last decades. In fact, Pashinyan had bypassed the Minsk Group and its efforts, which must not have escaped Aliyev's attention in Baku.

In late August, Pashinyan (in his role as prime minister) promoted a company's product. On his Facebook page, he calls on people to buy a T-shirt distributed by the company. This bears not only the name "Cilicia" with the coat of arms of Armenia, but also the image of Tigran the Great.<sup>26</sup>

Within a month Pashinyan has united Great Armenia (that is, together with Arzakh) and Cilicia in his person - even if only symbolically. The pathetic value of these two events converges realiter towards zero, if one keeps Khorenatsi in mind: The state in which Karabakh/Arzakh finds itself today is still due to the tension between the history of the Armenians and the history of Armenia, which Pashinyan wants to condense into an identity, i.e. it is ahistorical. The actually meaningful struggle for the right of self-determination versus the prerogative of territorial integrity, which is questionable in this relationship, is also inherent in this tension and cannot be negated in this way as Pashinyan would like. In doing so, he played into Aliyev's hands.

Anna Hakobyan, Pashinyan's wife, also tried to help: At the end of July, she was still promoting peace actions with Azerbaijani women<sup>27</sup>, which met with a divided response from the public. She said it was superfluous and would achieve nothing. In September, she underwent a one-week training course, and then at the end of October she wanted to go to the

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<sup>25</sup> <https://www.eurasiareview.com/07082019-pm-pashinyan-calls-for-unification-between-armenia-and-karabakh/>

<sup>26</sup> <http://top-news.am/>

[?p=57655&l=am&fbclid=IwAR0Tiyt5EUNEpHBFY5zA3lkPbHvglifmV5BQofpG86yu\\_HCvAt1GmjkILIE](https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1023034.html)

<sup>27</sup> <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1023034.html>

front herself.<sup>28</sup> The value of her actions, which could be ideally assigned to the realm of animism, is debatable. Incidentally, Pashinyan did not allow any dispute about his wife's actions: "Pashinyan's spouse, Anna Hakobyan, attended the meetings of the army staff. After Movses Hakobyan asked the Prime Minister's spouse to leave the session, he was called to Yerevan. Armenia's Defense Minister Tonoyan informed Movses Hakobyan there that the general was no longer allowed to be seen in Nagorno-Karabakh and that the order came directly from Pashinyan."<sup>29</sup>

The actionism of the prime ministerial couple Pashinyan/Hakobyan can be characterized with the attribution "gimmick": According to its origin, a gimmick refers to a device for manipulating games of chance.<sup>30</sup>

### **Pashinyan's "Motives for a Ceasefire Agreement"**

A news item from the German-Armenian Society features the original and translation of a Nov. 10 statement by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in which he speaks "about the motives for a cease-fire agreement."<sup>31</sup>

The document raises some questions. Pashinyan cites resource scarcity as one motive and ties it, by way of example, to "cases when the regiment of the Armed Forces was supposed to move for combat purposes, but the residents of the settlement closed the doors of the military unit and did not allow the vehicles to come out. We have had dozens of such cases. As a result, there was a problem in delivering equipment to the front lines." What does this tell us? The imprecise provision "residents of the settlement" may indicate that perhaps men were not supposed to go to the front and the doors were locked? Pashinyan also speaks of desertion and then makes the following double distinction: The military, which basically appears to be strong, is pitted against the weak civilian, who is weakening faster. Within the latter, however, the PM again makes out "heroic fighters". The army was too weak to exist for these reasons as well, and so the decision was made to take this difficult step.

In this context specifically, the aspect and cause of the ban to go to the front come up: The inhabitants of the settlement did not want to go. The following paragraph is also illustrative, referring to the occupied seven territories: "Why wasn't a ceasefire signed on September 27 under the same conditions? Regarding the issue, the RA Prime Minister stated that the

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<sup>28</sup> <https://jam-news.net/armenian-prime-ministers-wife-anna-hakobyan-to-be-sent-to-the-front-in-karabakh-nikol-pashinyan-war-news/>; ein Bild von ihr, vermutlich in Pose in: <https://turkeygazette.com/pashinyans-wife-anna-hakobyan-announced-we-are-going-to-the-front/>

<sup>29</sup> John Ayto, *Dictionary of Word Origins*, Arcade Publishing, New York 1990: 243

<sup>30</sup> John Ayto, *Dictionary of Word Origins*, Arcade Publishing, New York 1990: 243

<sup>31</sup> <https://armenpress.am/arm/news/1034474.html> 10. 11.

conditions of the ceasefire on September 27 remained the same. 'It could be accepted only on the condition of handing over the 7 regions known to us. We could not take such a step because we believed that the Artsakh army and the Armenian people could force us not to be interested in a ceasefire, but to impose a ceasefire on the enemy, which unfortunately did not happen. We could not believe that handing over territories was the right way to achieve a ceasefire. In this case, the question will arise why we decided to take such a step for a simple reason. After hearing the army's reports, we realized that the consequences for the future will be much more severe. No matter how hard it is, we just have to stop at this moment.'"<sup>32</sup>

In an interview Pashinyan gave on the 13th, he was asked why he did not inform the public of the worsening situation should the war continue. "Pashinyan said it would be more painful for the public than telling them that three territories must be returned. In other words, the decision was taken at the moment when it was clear that there was no point in fighting anymore. Our army truly fought until the end,' Pashinyan said, adding that he had been told that the war needed to be stopped immediately."<sup>33</sup> Pashinyan openly admits here that he knew better, but concealed it from the public. It can be concluded from what has been said that the people are more likely to understand when they are presented with a *fait accompli* that they have to give up their territories than when they are informed about bad developments. The added educational value of this approach may be debatable, since it claimed thousands of lives. Pashinyan speaks of conspiracy: "In all the possible scenarios to stop the war before the fall of Shushi, Shushi had to be handed over without a battle. I say this, knowing about the conspiracy...For instance, I said I couldn't hand over Shushi. We couldn't do that because Shushi is of special significance."<sup>34</sup> The conclusion of the message is also questionable: "Pashinyan noted that in the texts of the negotiations over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue there are several uncertainties that need to be interpreted this or that way, but the one thing that was certain was the fact that the seven regions had to be returned."<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, the ceasefire declaration he signed as Armenia's commander-in-chief is unclear in its interpretability on several points - the only certainty is that the regions must be returned.

Here it is noticeable that subliminally it would have been possible to reach a ceasefire already on September 27, however - the Karabakhtsis did not want to. Now things are worse than they could have been back then. Exposing in this passage the statement that Artsakh could have

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> <https://news.am/eng/news/613290.html>

<sup>34</sup> <https://news.am/eng/news/613290.html>

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

exerted coercion on them. Who has the power to exert coercion in this situation, that is, even before the war? Power, we know with Max Weber, is the condition of the possibility of imposing one's will even against the will of others. So who has the power of command and decision in this situation? Here is also significant the use of "Armenian people". Does this now encompass the Armenians in Arzakh, the whole of Armenia? What about the diaspora? But the expression here seems to refer more to the Armenians in Arzakh, since it is mentioned in the same breath as "Arzakh army". And here the idea is not far-fetched to address Pashinyan's personal attitude towards the Karabakh problem, which is only to be suggested here as a possibility, but which then includes Pashinyan's own past in connection with Kocharyan and Sarkysyan. In order to support this argument, we turn to the statement of Arzakh's president, Arayik Harutyunyan: "[...] The army was not in a good moral and psychological state; in certain places it was extremely bad. The troops that were on the front line for 43 days were exhausted because of covid, dysentery, etc. We did not have an opportunity to replace and to heal them. Military operations every day, killed and wounded every day, shelling every day. But regardless of all of these, we were able to resist the military forces of eight states. Certainly, we did not fight against Azerbaijan. For sure, it was not just Turkish forces and equipment on the front line and involved in the military operations. Mercenaries and terrorists from different countries were fighting. We have evidence and captives. Our volunteers and Armenian soldiers were fighting, I bow before all of you, but first of all before our soldiers; they are the most heroic boys in the world. I bow before the families and relatives of all the fallen soldiers. But we had to make a decision to save the lives of the same contract soldiers. Of course, we can say why we were not aware of the situation on time." <sup>36</sup> Here, Arzakh's president also addresses his own weaknesses, but ties them to conditions that can rather be called objective: Diseases, daily shelling, the front against Azeris, Turks and mercenaries at the same time and, above all, the drones, as he emphasizes in the same text. Harutyunyan also assumes a weakening of his army. However, he addresses it as a whole and does not divide it into strong and weak.

As far as the question of power and decision-making is concerned, the Armenian president spoke out<sup>37</sup>, claiming to have learned about the ceasefire only through the press. He was not

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<sup>36</sup> In: [https://www.evnreport.com/spotlight-karabakh/war-ends-what-next-live-updates?fbclid=IwAR3qNfHRA7q4F\\_0ZXx9NoAP9IVqF\\_5GASKY2461jxWnK1LJi4XECBgn8zpc](https://www.evnreport.com/spotlight-karabakh/war-ends-what-next-live-updates?fbclid=IwAR3qNfHRA7q4F_0ZXx9NoAP9IVqF_5GASKY2461jxWnK1LJi4XECBgn8zpc)

<sup>37</sup> [http://asbarez.com/198380/president-says-any-agreement-on-artsakh-must-stem-from-national-interests-and-consensus/?fbclid=IwAR1THqC0aBfsbqnK-xqZBYsBuMDZwmLUyK67aLGNr11ZJoXffMgffcc7r\\_s&\\_\\_cf\\_chl\\_jschl\\_tk\\_\\_=169573770ea484a0e6d725d251f4b1d6d5fb6b5f-1604993041-0-AWWZNUBjyXCACrNABMbCLRw-8hW4ip\\_-zEt1Vpal-rVf8SFSds9d-dCHHu1rgzaORT\\_Po9Mt-CiJUocvhSBuDftxnIufRc3qlFhxuQBYCuk90gwCHLyFSvjmbiRYp-uyG-GvBOgtY1kiFBIXyCeyEKp-nrMjHeEK17qyYxD2-KVhV9k-7gT27dnM052-kxptlyveNpOgiXyCYP520QnKY6RDc51BiwnJJsXo8yoFRcKXpHYsQVMm9WmK31zs0oRtE1xSZ7A2Nr5j](http://asbarez.com/198380/president-says-any-agreement-on-artsakh-must-stem-from-national-interests-and-consensus/?fbclid=IwAR1THqC0aBfsbqnK-xqZBYsBuMDZwmLUyK67aLGNr11ZJoXffMgffcc7r_s&__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=169573770ea484a0e6d725d251f4b1d6d5fb6b5f-1604993041-0-AWWZNUBjyXCACrNABMbCLRw-8hW4ip_-zEt1Vpal-rVf8SFSds9d-dCHHu1rgzaORT_Po9Mt-CiJUocvhSBuDftxnIufRc3qlFhxuQBYCuk90gwCHLyFSvjmbiRYp-uyG-GvBOgtY1kiFBIXyCeyEKp-nrMjHeEK17qyYxD2-KVhV9k-7gT27dnM052-kxptlyveNpOgiXyCYP520QnKY6RDc51BiwnJJsXo8yoFRcKXpHYsQVMm9WmK31zs0oRtE1xSZ7A2Nr5j)

consulted, President Sarkissian said: "Sadly, no consultations or discussions took place with me, as president of the Republic, about the agreement and I have not participated in any negotiations. The settlement of the Karabakh conflict is an important question that has national ramifications. Any step, activity or decision, especially signing any agreement, regarding the fundamental security of Armenia, Artsakh and the Armenian people must occur through comprehensive discussion and consultations."

Sarkissian represents all Armenians of the Republic of Armenia, while the PM presides over the parliament elected by the same people, which is an important distinction. However, Pashinyan repeatedly claimed to speak for "the Armenians" as a whole (thus tending to a 1:1 ratio).

On the very night of the agreement, demonstrations and riots by angry people broke out in Yerevan. In particular, veterans vented their anger at Pashinyan's decision.<sup>38</sup> He was a traitor not only to them. Emotionally all too understandable, this form of discourse of guilt obeys a well-known scheme of opposition, which we can call Vartan-Vasak opposition and goes back to Egish's description of Vardan's fight against the Sassanids in 451 and is proverbially assigned in such events. Vardan, the hero, and Vasak, the traitor, are also alternately assigned. It happened, for example, at the assassination on October 27, 1999, where figures in the David of Sassun epic were referred to the character traits of the assassinated Vasgen Sarkisyan and other politicians, or alternately he and his assassin Hunanyan were elevated to Vartan. Now, too, WS and defeat are charged pathetically and mythologically without circumstance.<sup>39</sup>

Above, Pashinyan's statement was referred to, in which he speaks of problems in the coordination of supplies, in logistics, but rather in the perspective of a participant observer. In fact, however, the entire preparation for the war on the part of Armenia was flawed: "The Armenian side was neither prepared against the Azerbaijani military, Turkish military advisers, Islamist militias and modern drone technology, nor was it up to all of this. The military front was on the verge of collapse, and after the capture of Shushi, more territories of

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<sup>38</sup> [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-pm-signs-deal-to-end-war-with-azerbaijan-and-](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-pm-signs-deal-to-end-war-with-azerbaijan-and-russia?CMP=share_btn_fb&fbclid=IwAR3tla9FhkrmM671_2u6zEINVdS1EpktHKCmzJ5665UMaEmnCzqWXNcf0RM)

[russia?CMP=share\\_btn\\_fb&fbclid=IwAR3tla9FhkrmM671\\_2u6zEINVdS1EpktHKCmzJ5665UMaEmnCzqWXNcf0RM](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-pm-signs-deal-to-end-war-with-azerbaijan-and-russia?CMP=share_btn_fb&fbclid=IwAR3tla9FhkrmM671_2u6zEINVdS1EpktHKCmzJ5665UMaEmnCzqWXNcf0RM). The demonstration was organized on the initiative of Kocharyan and Sargsyan, cf.

[https://anfddeutsch.com/hintergrund/die-nationale-frage-in-armenien-](https://anfddeutsch.com/hintergrund/die-nationale-frage-in-armenien-22822?fbclid=IwAR003gOG6neSX14c44LphrgxzXc-mZ4T4fRvRCmsEGM_ypljYyGVwOLmfp8)

[22822?fbclid=IwAR003gOG6neSX14c44LphrgxzXc-mZ4T4fRvRCmsEGM\\_ypljYyGVwOLmfp8](https://anfddeutsch.com/hintergrund/die-nationale-frage-in-armenien-22822?fbclid=IwAR003gOG6neSX14c44LphrgxzXc-mZ4T4fRvRCmsEGM_ypljYyGVwOLmfp8)

<sup>39</sup> Cf. this phenomenon Tölölian 1993.

Arzakh would have fallen to Azerbaijan."<sup>40</sup> In particular, the fact of a drone frigate on the enemy's side had been known since at least the April war in 2016, without any change in its own procurement situation. False arms purchases were also made.<sup>41</sup>

The agreement on November 9 provides for the return of the territories of Kelbajar, Aghdam and Lachin. Azerbaijan also gains additional territories they had at the time of the deal. This includes the strategically important city of Shushi, which sits above the capital city of Stepanakert. Perhaps the most far-reaching point concerns the establishment of a corridor to connect Nakhichevan with Azerbaijan, which passes through Armenian territory. This corridor is said to have been inserted at the express request of Aliyev. This could not have been done without Putin's consent, which may also be understood as an implicit salute to Pashinyan. A parallel to 1921 comes to mind: At that time Stalin gave Arzakh to Azerbaijan. The corridor in the south today appears as a continuation of then. In both cases, Russia both gained control over the South Caucasus and kept Turkey out: Turkey's influence in this area today would be limited.

The balance of power has shifted to include the greater Middle East region, making Russia "definitively the dominant actor there."<sup>42</sup> Although it is one of the winners in military terms, politically it has lost out: "Putin's castling has firmly established Russia as the arbiter in the Caucasus. Its soldiers are now close to the Turkish border and right on the Iranian border." Putin keeps Turkey out, but has gotten Syria under his influence. Europe has maneuvered itself out with the active help of the German side. It should have put a stop to "Turkey's dangerous firing in the Caucasus in advance by imposing tough sanctions": "In this case, the only morally acceptable thing to do would have been what is required in terms of realpolitik. Democratic Armenia would have deserved all Europe's solidarity with authoritarian Azerbaijan."<sup>43</sup>

## **Weber's Types of Mind in Politics**

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<sup>40</sup> [https://anfdeutsch.com/hintergrund/die-nationale-frage-in-armenien-22822?fbclid=IwAR003gOG6neSX14c44LphrgxzXc-mZ4T4fRvRCmsEGM\\_ypljYyGVwOLmfp8](https://anfdeutsch.com/hintergrund/die-nationale-frage-in-armenien-22822?fbclid=IwAR003gOG6neSX14c44LphrgxzXc-mZ4T4fRvRCmsEGM_ypljYyGVwOLmfp8)

<sup>41</sup> [https://caucasuswatch.de/news/3269?fbclid=IwAR1obATr0\\_89gKCZOd0fv8ZPJkBYdZy0AUXg2egpJq7OmWUG6pLkcpvqLPE](https://caucasuswatch.de/news/3269?fbclid=IwAR1obATr0_89gKCZOd0fv8ZPJkBYdZy0AUXg2egpJq7OmWUG6pLkcpvqLPE)

<sup>42</sup> Michael Sommer: <https://www.facebook.com/michael.sommer.75470> (16.11.)

<sup>43</sup> Ibid; cf. Kolter, Reasons...: "... the supposed Turkish-Russian collaboration in the award of Karabakh to AZB (July 1921), which will also be decisive in the future, can and must be problematized internationally and corrected in a way that is binding under international law, because the alleged international law affiliation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan is and means until today the successful continuation of Turkey's genocidal Armenian policy in combination with early Soviet/early Stalinist empathy with Turkish territorial claims in the name of safeguarding/popularizing the October Revolution among South Caucasian Muslims (and beyond)."

An Armenian colleague once wrote to me that in Armenian culture it is important to know who is saying something. I added that, relative to this, it is less important what is said. It follows per se that the construction of reality tends to be assumed in disregard of its nature and that one has to care about the constructor. This enters into the value of the relationship between subject and object: "Journalists must ask not only about the conditions of their subjective perception, but also about the nature of the world of their objects. The first and most important professional ethical demand on journalists is that their information be correct. Those who only ask about the subjective part of it relativize this basic professional requirement. In constructivism, which doubts the existence of objects in principle because we can only be sure of their subjective construction, the interaction between subject and object of communication disappears [...]." <sup>44</sup>

The work of the mind by the journalist claimed by Weber also implies the observance of ethical principles concerning the relation between ethic of attitude and ethic of responsibility: "Not that ethic of attitude is identical with irresponsibility and ethic of responsibility with irresponsibility. There is no question of that, of course. But it is an abysmal contrast whether one acts under the ethic of attitude - religiously speaking: 'the Christian does right and entrusts success to God', or under the ethic of responsibility: that one has to answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of one's actions." <sup>45</sup> The suitable politician, the suitable journalist, each in his professional field, must find the suitable relationship for himself between ethics and responsibility.

Weber distinguishes three types of spirit in politics. <sup>46</sup> In order to explain the relations between spirit politics of, responsibility politics and real politics, we resort to Pashinyan's performance in Arzach and with the "Cilicia" T-shirt. Responsibility politics stands between Gesinnungspolitik and Realpolitik. Weber, however, couples the first two forms in an interrelation in order to foresee realpolitik from here. This means that the politician creates realpolitik, which, however, he already finds in his relationship. The sentence "Karabakh is Armenia" and the performance with the T-shirt have, from the point of view of responsibility politics, an attitude value, which they gain from the sphere of attitude politics, but which by

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<sup>44</sup> Horst Pöttker: Max Weber als Klassiker der Journalistik und Kommunikationswissenschaft. [https://www.rkm-journal.de/archives/18278\\_15.7.2015](https://www.rkm-journal.de/archives/18278_15.7.2015)

<sup>45</sup> Weber: Politik als Beruf. MÜNCHEN UND LEIPZIG/U26 VERLAG VON DUNCKER. & HUMBLO, S. 57f

<sup>46</sup> Vgl. Tabelle in Schuster, S. 245

definition is related to success value and thus also reaches into real politics. Pashinyan's actions, however, could not be assigned a success value. Pashinyan assumes no responsibility for any consequences that arise from this. Responsibility-politically the will to "rule the world" is not present here. But also, if one wanted to refer only the attitude-political aspect for itself to the case, one could speak probably of attitude value and world escape, but also here Pashinyan does not take responsibility for his attitude. This means that in all three categories of political spirit one must speak of deficient action. This is significant because it had to be perceived and evaluated accordingly by the other side.

In the case of Pashinyan's person, it is striking that he, in a sense, went from journalism to politics, whereby, as was seen above, the question arises as to whether he handed journalism over to politics at the checkroom. Between the lines, the descriptions of the state of affairs in Karabakh read like the report of a journalist – it takes no wonder that the character of the participant observer come to mind in this regard. However, if we have in mind the actions of the journalist and politician as social figures, Max Weber's "Politics as a Profession" comes to mind. The date of Weber's lecture is also significant: he gave the lecture "Politics as a Profession" in 1919 in the midst of the revolutionary turmoil and the Treaty of Versailles negotiations, respectively. Sevres and Lausanne are not far removed in time from this. Levon Ter-Petrossian refers decidedly to 1920 as a parallel to the current situation.<sup>47</sup> In the case of Pashinyan, this association is also permissible because he seems to feel the urge to go to the West, which is why a few thoughts on the relationship between politics of attitude and politics of responsibility should follow in conclusion, especially with regard to the political and ethical aspects of the course of the conflict.

For Max Weber, the contemporary journalist "belongs to a kind of pariah caste, which is always socially assessed in 'society' according to its ethically low-ranking representatives," but who, according to performance, "claims at least as much 'spirit' as any scholarly achievement."<sup>48</sup> Journalist and demagogue alike possess no "fixed -social classification."<sup>49</sup>

With revolution, Weber argues, emerge minded politicians, faith fighters. Analogous to the history of religion, where there are real and fake prophets, in the history of politics one is

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<sup>47</sup> Մենք նորից վերադառնում ենք 1920 թվականի իրավիճակին. Լևոն Տեր-Պետրոսյան 06-12-2020 [https://armlife.am/news/131436.html?fbclid=IwAR253VtSbaBqtBtwpuKUKC7SUP4ECIcj3boBmOISbq\\_AXAn40kc9dJOW\\_z4](https://armlife.am/news/131436.html?fbclid=IwAR253VtSbaBqtBtwpuKUKC7SUP4ECIcj3boBmOISbq_AXAn40kc9dJOW_z4)

<sup>48</sup> Max Weber: Politik als Beruf. MÜNCHEN UND LEIPZIG/U26 VERLAG VON DUNCKER. & HUMBLO, S. 58)

<sup>49</sup> Max Weber: PaB, 1926:29



confronted with real and fake faith fighters. In the case of the genuine faith fighter, for Weber, this specific constellation of ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility occurs, where both "are ultimately not absolute opposites, but complements, which together only make up the genuine human being, the one who can have the 'vocation to politics'" (MWG I/17, p. 250)" <sup>50</sup> In this sense, Pashinyan would definitely be described as a "faith fighter" as a politician of conviction, "who devotes himself to a self-chosen super-personal cause and gets involved in the struggle for power." <sup>51</sup> The associated unconditionality with which he follows his creed makes one fear the decoupling of such a policy from that of a responsibility, since not only are the consequences a) not foreseen, but b) there also seems to be no personal responsibility. Pashinyan is therefore a false believer.

This can also be seen in the fate of the city of Shushi in the course of the negotiations on 9/11. The strategically important city of Shushi had to be handed over to Azerbaijan as well. <sup>52</sup> But this had never been the program. Pashinyan stated that a "return" of Shushi had been part of the talks since 2016, which the foreign minister rejected. Significantly, Sohrab Mnazakanjan submitted his resignation on Nov. 16, the day of this dispute over the city's status. Shushi, Pashinyan said, was in a desolate state and a gloomy city. If it had been so important, why had it been left in that state and not developed? Putin also said that Shushi was never up for debate. He said Yerevan rejected control of Shushi but with Azerbaijani refugees. <sup>53</sup>

### **Pashinyan's speech on 5.12.2020**

A memorable speech of Pashinyan, which he addressed "to the nation" on 5.12. <sup>54</sup>, shows in the analysis that the prime minister fails in all three points, whether as an attitude,

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<sup>50</sup> Schluchter 245

<sup>51</sup> Ebd.

<sup>52</sup> It should be emphasized here that it is not possible to speak of "giving back", because both Armenians and Azerbaijanis or Muslims shared in the city - in contrast to Arzakh, which in this sense also and in the strict sense cannot be given back.

<sup>53</sup> [http://asbarez.com/198572/putin-says-armenias-recognition-of-karabakh-could-have-significantly-influenced-outcome/?fbclid=IwAR3\\_nX0MQGvHraMe7ygiG6iIeJhXEoTI-O4HFrMxbkJUBNv0YYhUyuGbFfc&\\_\\_cf\\_chl\\_jschl\\_tk\\_\\_=868849070cf71ced24b57ddc9a1947ab8f31d796-1605781126-0-Aagiw6Nit92EbIX7A-Y-W6FfwMj8V715E589eU8bNKtjHYxsXkwRNSIaWZo6-Y0fLaNJWF43V1QmXbnAANj1sfw2\\_JZUy6DB08l2yyXnKqtz0EJqq\\_MLw8bfXwuUhB5hiuXSxGZIXZOxwJhlxMp1OCLO7jdYmB3ayLJTZGrrbyi0V7wq1NH1EXjEOPaxd7-rOKnPnaLa6Xs8JgGk\\_jjzIYgT-2-WFoYk64f5TI9P1zURcJaR5diNgdsiYhEWGs38HrXUfv1JMnrScpLoHfpri3cSQwFQs63BsvthCovV8SoEtiOT hDnUpJptSxaUBob4WA3kiXvCNtbzhxTEMJR\\_ogosi5vzclTKpXNdr2P2lCrYl-78swCzkfoA2xkC4h7EZcds8sj3KG8FrqtZB0hKaa8KxZBonVKr0zJ6gWgwXtx5HODau5fb2mtuhN\\_dVUwTKlg9wMblx2-P5Rioz701yA\\_RIgvn\\_H7I1ZkXnfw1raAUjm96bsX6k-gSzVPtEHALuJm9AkDj2nzIErIrbh\\_zqY](http://asbarez.com/198572/putin-says-armenias-recognition-of-karabakh-could-have-significantly-influenced-outcome/?fbclid=IwAR3_nX0MQGvHraMe7ygiG6iIeJhXEoTI-O4HFrMxbkJUBNv0YYhUyuGbFfc&__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=868849070cf71ced24b57ddc9a1947ab8f31d796-1605781126-0-Aagiw6Nit92EbIX7A-Y-W6FfwMj8V715E589eU8bNKtjHYxsXkwRNSIaWZo6-Y0fLaNJWF43V1QmXbnAANj1sfw2_JZUy6DB08l2yyXnKqtz0EJqq_MLw8bfXwuUhB5hiuXSxGZIXZOxwJhlxMp1OCLO7jdYmB3ayLJTZGrrbyi0V7wq1NH1EXjEOPaxd7-rOKnPnaLa6Xs8JgGk_jjzIYgT-2-WFoYk64f5TI9P1zURcJaR5diNgdsiYhEWGs38HrXUfv1JMnrScpLoHfpri3cSQwFQs63BsvthCovV8SoEtiOT hDnUpJptSxaUBob4WA3kiXvCNtbzhxTEMJR_ogosi5vzclTKpXNdr2P2lCrYl-78swCzkfoA2xkC4h7EZcds8sj3KG8FrqtZB0hKaa8KxZBonVKr0zJ6gWgwXtx5HODau5fb2mtuhN_dVUwTKlg9wMblx2-P5Rioz701yA_RIgvn_H7I1ZkXnfw1raAUjm96bsX6k-gSzVPtEHALuJm9AkDj2nzIErIrbh_zqY)

<sup>54</sup> "We have not failed in diplomacy; we failed in our attempts to cope with the burden of the past 20-25 years' diplomatic failures" - PM addresses the nation

<https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/12/05/Nikol-Pashinyan-message/>

responsibility or real politician - together with his wife, who, to begin with, does not live up to her social position and grossly violates it. According to Weber, politics of attitude and politics of responsibility do not exclude each other - on the other hand, attitude without responsibility leads us to Anna Hakobyan at the front in disregard of what is feasible in terms of real politics: As the MP's wife, which would have been the only legitimation, this is politically unacceptable. The aforementioned ejection by the prime minister, after the uninvited wife was expelled from the meeting, turns politics into a family event: to put it pointedly, Pashinyan's point here is not so much to dominate the world as to make the honor of the family seem manageable, which could lead us to the traditional character of Armenian politics.

One must understand Pashinyan's speech as a direct reaction to Robert Kocharyan's publication a day earlier, in which the latter said that under his government war would not have occurred and the country would not have reached such a state.<sup>55</sup> The fact that Pashinyan responds to Kocharyan only a few hours later the next day suggests that he takes it personally, which again is nothing new, considering his personal stance on the 2008 events and how it feeds into the political plot.

Pashinyan takes "personal responsibility" but does not draw any personal consequences - by resigning. We know this approach, at least in Germany. Politically - with understandable economic backgrounds - a distinction can be made between the party responsible and the party causing the damage. In practice, and in the case of the prime minister, this means that he accepts responsibility, but that others have caused the damage and are actually responsible. He says: He takes responsibility for the last 25-30 years. But the weight is on the then 23-28 years under the governments before, focusing on the period between 2008 and 2018.

Let me trace this with a few examples on the text. Pashinyan claims that the international perception of Armenia as an occupier was created by the governments before, not during his own government. Ultimately, the current result is the result of the governments before. Pashinyan here adopts the Western position that the seven territories are "occupied" without taking into account the underlying intention of the territories as a buffer zone, which were also not inhabited, which was only started under his government! If he understands what he describes in his speech as liberation from the stigma of occupation: "[...] during the last 2 years there has been an attempt to get out of that magical circle"<sup>56</sup>, then one must hold against

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<sup>55</sup> Vgl. <https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/politics/20201204/25624960/Kocharyan-rasskazal-o-samoy-provalnoy-operatsii-privedshey-k-katastrofe-v-Karabakhe.html>

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

him the above-mentioned breach of the principles of the Minsk Group by such an action. The speech sequence is by no means devoid of a demagogic character, which also pervades the speech in toto and identifies the prime minister as a gazette journalist: He turns the external perception ("Armenians are occupiers!") into his own perception and projects this onto the governments before him in order to distance himself from them. In this way, he becomes a person in charge who can simply tear up the indictment. By making the external perception (which is false, by the way) his own internal perception, he also abandons the personal sphere of responsibility that applies to the past, which he nevertheless took upon himself at the beginning of his speech.

Pashinyan's speech is marked by the feeling of resentment, which turns out to be a pure reaction to Kocharyan's remarks and seems to express itself by rejecting responsibility par excellence. This can be seen in the example of poor weaponry when he states that they have been buying for the last 25 years. Reading this, one gets the impression that under his government there was no inventory control before weapons were used. As prime minister, he is also commander-in-chief in the military in the event of war, yet he says: "Is the prime minister leading a battle? Does the Prime Minister make decisions at the level of a platoon commander or even a regiment commander? Did the Prime Minister make decisions alone?"<sup>57</sup> By which, again, he feels no responsibility for himself as the holder of the country's leading political post.

Pashinyan's Cilicia gimmick can serve as a final comparison. While Pashinyan failed to exercise caution in cherry-picking in the West, especially with regard to the resulting relationship with Russia, Armenian culture flourished during the Cilicia period, especially in the area of diplomacy with opponents in the West AND the East. In this respect, Pashinyan's show with the T-shirt in intention and subsequent tragic outcome is an indirect commentary on his own politics - from the depths of the past into the present.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

1. Ereignisse, die auch als Zufall wahrgenommen werden können, fallen den Wahrnehmenden in dieser Relation zu, werden hierdurch sozusagen "bestimmbar".

Events, which can also be seen as coincidence, are subject to the perceivers in this relation and determinable by this.

4 / 3 Es handelte sich jedoch nicht um eine von Meister implizierte „Genozid-Fixierung“ seitens Armenier, was eher die Unbilden deutscher Gedächtnispolitik abbilden ließe. Art und Weise des Angriffskrieges, die Qualität und Quantität der Destruktion von Menschen und Materie sollte Genozid-Assoziationen bei den Armeniern hervorrufen, passieren also nicht, indem man dort in der Kiste der Vergangenheit herumkramt und zuordnet (vgl. Christian Kolter: Gründe, warum die derzeitige Waffenruhe vom 9.11.2020 auf Grundlage der dreiseitigen Erklärung (noch lange) keine Stabilität im Karabach-Konflikt bringt.

However, this was not a "genocide fixation" on behalf of the Armenians implied by Meister, which would be more likely to reflect the vagaries of the politics of memory in Germany. The manner of the war of aggression, the quality and quantity of the destruction of people and matter should evoke genocide associations among Armenians, and therefore do not happen by rummaging around in the box of the past and assigning them (cf. Christian Kolter: Reasons why the current 9/11/2020 ceasefire based on the tripartite declaration will not bring stability to the Karabakh conflict (for a long time yet).

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7/3 In URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24259334>, S. 145, 153 macht Luchterhandt den Begriff der Volksgruppe als Minderheit für den Fall der Krimtataren fest.

In URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24259334>, pp. 145, 153, Luchterhandt makes the concept of ethnic group as minority for the case of the Crimean Tatars.

8/4 <sup>1</sup> Vgl. Sendung „Kulturzeit“ vom 13.11.2020 [https://www.3sat.de/kultur/kulturzeit/krieg-in-berg-karabach-100.html?fbclid=IwAR1cqHUKge1kP7G4DA0Pxsqfzc1InlUbnGA\\_WXLvkbG-OGCociLvdhW4rtA](https://www.3sat.de/kultur/kulturzeit/krieg-in-berg-karabach-100.html?fbclid=IwAR1cqHUKge1kP7G4DA0Pxsqfzc1InlUbnGA_WXLvkbG-OGCociLvdhW4rtA)

Cf. broadcast

Generell Ebd u. vgl.

13/6 Auch Silvia Stöber von der ARD-tagesschau entdeckt bei der AfD Schief lagen wie die Annahme, dass es in Armenien „um die christliche Zivilisation“ ginge. Die Gründe jedoch, wieso diese Reduktion zu kurz greife, ist selber fragwürdig: Für die Frau von der der ARD steht Geld zur Rekrutierung der Islamisten zur Verfügung.

Geld aber, so zeigt die historische Erfahrung, stand einer Ausbreitung von Religion und religiösen Fundamentalismus nie im Wege, schließt sich also nicht aus.

Silvia Stöber from the ARD-tageschau also discovers slippages in the AfD, such as the assumption that "Christian civilization" is at stake in Armenia. The reasons, however, why this reduction falls short is itself questionable: For the woman from the ARD, money is available to recruit the Islamists. Money, however, as historical experience shows, never stood in the way of the spread of religion and religious fundamentalism, so it does not exclude itself.

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15/6

Ebd. Zur Verbindung zwischen Linke und Islam: Pascal Bruckner: Die Islam-Linke oder: Die Vereinigung des Zorns, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik. 12/2020, S. 85-94

Ibid. On the connection between the Left and Islam: Pascal Bruckner: Die Islam-Linke oder: Die Vereinigung des Zorns, in

17/7 Langner zieht für seine Argumentation Rosa Luxemburg heran, die „bereits hellseherisch erkannt, dass ein ethnizistisches Verständnis von Selbstbestimmung mit einer internationalistischen Klassenpolitik unvereinbar ist“ (<https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/43074/ein-neuer-krieg-um-bergkarabach?cHash=ffbeca95f83edf2896de63bef963ab52>). Hinzuzufügen wäre dann implizit noch die Rolle der Religion, die angeblich beim Krieg mit eine Rolle spiele (<https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/kampfkulturen-religionen-bergkarabach-101.html>). Um das Verhältnis von Religion zu Politik für den Fall Arzach/Armenien auszuloten, behelfen wir uns der von mir beschriebenen Szene mit dem Veteranen im Museum des Siegesdenkmals. In der Architektur des Saales im ersten Stock, verdichten sich Raum und Zeit und das Verhältnis des armenischen Christentums zur es umgebenden Sphäre, die damals eine sowjetische mit entsprechenden Bedingungen war (vgl. Gispert 2002, 2005). Das armenische Christentum baute sich seinen Raum in solch einem Verhältnis, was bis in seine Gründerzeit zurückgeht (fwd. Gispert 2021)

Langner draws on Rosa Luxemburg for his argument, who "already clairvoyantly recognized that an ethnicist understanding of self-determination is incompatible with an internationalist class politics" “ (<https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/43074/ein-neuer-krieg-um-bergkarabach?cHash=ffbeca95f83edf2896de63bef963ab52>). Hinzuzufügen wäre dann implizit noch die Rolle der Religion, die angeblich beim Krieg mit eine Rolle spiele

"In order to sound out the relationship of religion to politics for the case of Arzach/Armenia, we make use of the scene I have described with the veteran in the Victory Monument Museum. In the architecture of the hall on the second floor, space and time and the relationship of Armenian Christianity to the sphere surrounding it, which at that time was a Soviet one with corresponding conditions (cf. Gispert 2002, 2005), are condensed. Armenian Christianity built its space in such a relation, which goes back to its founding period (fwd. Gispert 2021)

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22/8 <sup>1</sup> Simonyans Attacken wurden in Armenien natürlich als Angriff auf die eigen Nation verstanden, weswegen sie dort „als Armenierin“ wohl nicht mehr gelitten sein durfte. Zynisch könnte man die Reaktion des Westens auf die Bitten Pashinyans hin als „Opfer-Sympathie“ bezeichnen.

Simonyan's attacks were naturally understood in Armenia as an attack on her own nation, which is why she was no longer allowed to be suffered there "as an Armenian". Cynically, the reaction of the West to Pashinyan's pleas could be described as "victim sympathy."

38/13 Vgl. zu diesem Phänomen Tölölian 1993.

Cf. This phenomenon

42/15 <sup>1</sup> Ebd.; vgl. Kolter, Gründe...: „... die vermeintlich auch zukünftig entscheidende türkisch-russische Kollaboration bei der Zuschlagung Karabachs an AZB (Juli 1921) kann und muss international problematisiert und völkerrechtlich verbindlich korrigiert werden, denn die angebliche völkerrechtliche Zugehörigkeit Berg-Karabachs zu Aserbaidtschan ist und bedeutet bis heute die erfolgreiche Fortsetzung der genozidalen Armenienpolitik der Türkei in Kombination mit frühsowjetischer/ frühstalinistischer Empathie mit türkischen Gebietsansprüchen im Namen der Absicherung/Popularisierung der Oktoberrevolution unter südkaukasischen Muslimen (und darüber hinaus)“

*Ibid; cf. Kolter, Reasons...: "... the supposed Turkish-Russian collaboration in the award of Karabakh to AZB (July 1921), which will also be decisive in the future, can and must be problematized internationally and corrected in a way that is binding under international law, because the alleged international law affiliation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan is and means until today the successful continuation of Turkey's genocidal Armenian policy in combination with early Soviet/early Stalinist empathy with Turkish territorial claims in the name of safeguarding/popularizing the October Revolution among South Caucasian Muslims (and beyond)."*

46/16 als Verweis für die Möglichkeit der Bezugnahme)

48/17 PaB, Politik als Beruf

51/17 Es soll hier ausdrücklich betont werden, dass nicht von „zurückgeben“ gesprochen werden kann, denn sowohl Armenier als auch Aserbaidtschaner bzw. Muslime teilten sich in die Stadt – im Gegensatz zu Arzach, was in diesem Sinne ebenfalls und im strengen Sinne nicht zurückgegeben werden kann.

It should be emphasized here that it is not possible to speak of "giving back", because both Armenians and Azerbaijanis or Muslims shared in the city - in contrast to Arzach, which in this sense also and in the strict sense cannot be given back.